Does spending more money win more votes? Moldova’s 2025 elections

campaign finance
campaign spending
electoral returns
elections
Moldova
This blog post asks a simple question: did the parties and candidates that spent more money in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections also get more votes? It shows how much spending goes with a given vote share, and what the chances of reaching the 5% threshold were at different spending levels. It is the third post based on my analysis in the Moldovan Analytical Digest.
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May 23, 2026

This is the third post based on my analysis in the Moldovan Analytical Digest (Lipcean, 2026). The first and second posts examined how the parties and candidates in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections gathered their campaign funds and how they spent them, so here I turn to the question that naturally follows: did the contestants with the deepest pockets also obtain the most votes?

The short answer is yes, but mainly at the top of the spending ladder. Contestants running on a very limited budget attracted very few votes, whereas the big spenders secured far more. In addition, the more funding a contestant had already invested, the more support each additional euro appeared to bring. With only 21 contestants, however, it is nearly impossible to say precisely how much money one needed to invest for a given vote share.

Acronym Electoral contestant
ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
AM Moldovans Alliance
AUR Alliance for the Union of Romanians
BEA Alternative Bloc
BEP Patriotic Electoral Bloc
BEÎ Together Bloc
CI-AN Independent candidate, Andrei Năstase
CI-OS Independent candidate, Olesea Stamate
CI-TC Independent candidate, Tatiana Crețu
CI-VS Independent candidate, Victoria Sanduța
CUB Coalition for Unity and Welfare
LOC League of Cities and Communes
MRM Respect Moldova Movement
NOI New Historical Option
PAS Party of Action and Solidarity
PDA Democracy at Home Party
PL Liberal Party
PN Our Party
PNM National Moldovan Party
PSDE European Social Democratic Party
UCSM Christian-Social Union of Moldova

A preliminary glance of the data

Figure 1 plots, for each contestant, how much it spent against the share of the votes it obtained. I measure spending in two ways: monetary spending, which counts only the cash actually spent and total spending, which also includes the value of activities carried out by volunteers. Figure 1 presents the information on total spending. Since spending varies enormously, from less than €2,000 to more than €1.5 million, the x-axis uses a logarithmic scale, thus helping to show small and large spenders against their vote shares in the same picture. Each dot is a contestant, and the dashed red line marks the 5% threshold required to enter parliament, so the green dots above the line are the contestants that cleared the electoral threshold.

Overall, contestants that spent more gained more votes, while the four biggest spenders all surpassed 5%. Yet the picture is not as clear as one may expect. For instance, the Democracy at Home Party (PDA) cleared the threshold with only about €12,500, while the Moldovans Alliance (AM) and Respect Moldova Movement (MRM) poured about €235 thousand and €300 thousand into their campaign chests respectively, but collected less than 1% of the votes.

A scatter plot where each point is an electoral contestant, placed by total spending in thousand euro (logarithmic axis) and vote share. Contestants that got 5 percent or more are in a different colour; spending and vote share are positively related.
Figure 1: Campaign spending and vote share of electoral contestants in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections. Spending includes the value of volunteer work and is shown on a logarithmic scale. The dashed line is the 5% threshold.

How many votes does spending go with?

To uncover the overall pattern behind the dots in Figure 1, I fitted a Bayesian beta regression to the data, which is a model suited to outcomes that are proportions, like the vote share in our case. A key difference from a standard Beta regression is that instead of estimating a single best-fit line, the Bayesian model generates thousands of plausible lines consistent with the data. Figure 2 shows these lines for total and monetary spending. The solid line is the median of those plausible lines produced by the model, while the shaded bands show the ranges containing 50%, 80%, and 95% of them.

A contestant spending €100 thousand is expected to obtain about 2.3% of the votes (most likely between 1.1% and 4.5%), whereas with €500 thousand the expected share increases to about 8.7% (between 5.6% and 13.4%). The model is more uncertain at high spending levels, simply because fewer contestants spent large amounts relative to more contestants that spent much less. If one takes only monetary spending, €500 thousand corresponds to roughly 17.6% of the votes.

Two panels, one for total spending and one for monetary spending, each with a rising curve of expected vote share against spending in thousand euro on a logarithmic axis, with blue bands that widen at high spending, and the contestants as points.
Figure 2: Expected vote share by spending level in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections. The line is the middle estimate, the bands show where 50%, 80% and 95% of the possible curves fall. Points are the contestants; the dashed line is the 5% threshold. Curves stop at the highest spending observed for each measure.

Does each extra euro buy more votes?

The steepening of the curve implies that the more a contestant has already spent, the more votes an additional euro appears to buy. To illustrate, consider a contestant that doubles its spending and ask how much its vote share would increase. Figure 3 answers this for five starting levels, from €25,000 to €400,000. Each marker depicts the range of plausible gains in percentage points: the dot is the middle estimate, the thick and thin lines contain 80% and 95% of the plausible values, and the dashed line marks no change.

A contestant starting at €25 thousand that doubles its budget to €50 thousand gains only about 0.3 percentage points in vote share, whereas one starting at €200 thousand and doubling to €400 thousand gains about 3.2 percentage points. In other words, votes are not bought at a fixed price: extra spending has little effects on electoral gains at lower spending levels but matters far more at higher ones. This somewhat sustains the idea that large budgets unlock expensive but effective campaign tools, such as TV advertising and professional campaigns, that small budgets cannot afford. Yet, as the Figure 3 shows, the model is also significantly more uncertain about the size of electoral gains at higher spending levels as illustrated by a wider range of plausible values for the well-funded contestants.

Two panels with distributions of the change in vote share, in percentage points, when spending doubles from five starting levels between 25 and 400 thousand euro. The effect and its uncertainty both grow with the starting level.
Figure 3: Change in expected vote share (percentage points) when spending doubles, starting from different spending levels in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections (dot: middle estimate; thick and thin lines: 80% and 95% plausible ranges).

What were the chances of getting into parliament?

The curve in Figure 2 is the model’s central estimate of the vote share, depending exclusively on the money spent. However, electoral success and actual votes a contestant obtains also hinges on factors the model does not know, including the quality of the contestants, public recognition, whether they are in government or in opposition or plain luck. Figure 4 takes this uncertainty into account and shows, for each spending level, the chance of winning at least 5% of the votes.

For instance, contestants spending €100 thousand have a chance of clearing electoral threshold of about 15%, for those spending €300 thousand the chance jumps to 41%, while with €500 thousand it increases to 68%. Even contestants with the smallest budgets have a chance of passing the threshold of around 7%, which fits the case of PDA - a highly unlikely case, but it happened.

Two panels with a rising curve of the chance of reaching 5 percent of the votes against spending in thousand euro on a logarithmic axis, one for total and one for monetary spending, starting around 10 percent and approaching 100 percent for high spending.
Figure 4: Chance of getting at least 5% of the votes by spending level in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections. The curve is averaged over all the possible curves of the model.

So how much does a contestant need to spend before it can expect to reach 5%? Each of the thousands of possible curves crosses the 5% line at a different spending level, and Figure 5 shows how these spending levels are spread out. The black dot is the middle estimate, the thick and thin lines contain 80% and 95% of the possible values, while the dashed vertical line shows the estimate of a simpler beta model, which generates very close estimates, at about €301 thousand for the total spending model and about €213 thousand for the monetary spending one. Hence, the Bayesian model gives slightly lower estimates of the spending needed to reach 5% than the simpler beta model, although the difference is small compared with the range of plausible values.

For the total spending (left-hand panel), the middle estimate is about €289 thousand, but it could plausibly lie anywhere between €108 thousand and €443 thousand. For the monetary spending model (right-hand panel), the middle estimate is about €208 thousand (between €129 and €275 thousand). Given the wide range of plausible spending values, with 21 contestants it is hard to say accurately how much money a competitor needed to spend to clear the electoral threshold. Yet we know from the data that it required a rather hefty campaign budget.

Two panels showing the distribution of the spending level in thousand euro at which the expected vote share reaches 5 percent, for total and monetary spending. The distributions are wide, with the simple model estimate as a vertical line inside them.
Figure 5: Spending level beyond which the expected vote share stays above 5%, in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections. The distribution is from the Bayesian model (dot: middle estimate; thick and thin lines: 80% and 95% plausible ranges). The dashed line represents the estimate from a simple beta regression model.

What this does not tell us

These numbers show how spending and votes moved together in this parliamentary contest, but they do not prove that more spending did attract more votes. A popular party can attract both money and votes, and with only 21 contestants and money as a single factor, one cannot be certain about its role. Other factors, such as holding government office, party organisation, media coverage and name recognition matter a lot and we have not accounted for them. Moreover, these figures cover only officially declared spending, not illicit funds, which by their nature are hard to measure.

To conclude, while more spending went hand in hand with more votes, this relationship was not linear. Small campaign budgets yielded almost no electoral returns and a substantial war chest was needed for a realistic chance of clearing the 5% threshold. Moreover at already high spending levels, each additional euro appeared to matter more. But money was not a guarantee for electoral success, since some relatively big spenders fell short and a modest one managed to get into parliament.

The model is a Bayesian beta regression, a method designed for outcomes that are percentages, such as vote shares. I estimated it with the brms package for R (Bürkner, 2017; see also Ferrari & Cribari-Neto, 2004; Grün et al., 2012), separately for total and for monetary spending. It lets the effect of spending change with the spending level, so that small and big budgets are not forced to follow the same straight line. I chose this set-up after testing simpler and more flexible alternatives: I left each contestant out in turn, checked how well each version predicted that contestant’s vote share, and this one predicted best, or as well as the others, for both measures. The model starts from deliberately vague assumptions, so that the data and not my own expectations drive the results, and I checked that the estimation ran without problems. The data on spending and election results come from the Central Electoral Commission (Comisia Electorală Centrală, 2025b, 2025a).

References

Bürkner, P.-C. (2017). Brms: An R package for Bayesian multilevel models using Stan. Journal of Statistical Software, 80(1), 1–28.
Comisia Electorală Centrală. (2025a). Pentru aprobarea Raportului cu privire la rezultatele alegerilor parlamentare din 28 septembrie 2025. https://a.cec.md/ro/pentru-aprobarea-raportului-cu-privire-la-rezultatele-alegerilor-parlamentare-di-2751_115477.html
Comisia Electorală Centrală. (2025b). Sistemul informatic “Control financiar”. https://finante.cec.md/reports.aspx
Ferrari, S., & Cribari-Neto, F. (2004). Beta regression for modelling rates and proportions. Journal of Applied Statistics, 31(7), 799–815.
Grün, B., Kosmidis, I., & Zeileis, A. (2012). Extended beta regression in R: Shaken, stirred, mixed, and partitioned. Journal of Statistical Software, 48, 1–25.
Lipcean, S. (2026). Campaign financing in Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections. Moldovan Analytical Digest, 5, 2–17. https://doi.org/10.3929/ethz-c-000793910